This paper studies the proactive eavesdropping for the potential energy-constrained suspicious communication system with one full-duplex-enabled legitimate monitor. Specifically, for such a system, we consider the proactive eavesdropping over finite time blocks under the off-line framework. In each time block, the monitor first acts as the masked power beacon deliberately to proceed wireless energy transfer to the suspicious transmitter for its uplink data transmission, then adaptively executes jamming, passive eavesdropping or assisting strategy based on our provided exact channel condition with strict proofs. According to these adaptive strategies and considering the optimization of transmit power at the monitor, we aim to solve the problem of sum eavesdropping rates maximization over N (N ≥ 1) time blocks subject to limited power at the monitor, which is explained as a difficult mixed-inter nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem. Fortunately, it is shown that this MINLP problem can be divided into one jamming subproblem and one passive eavesdropping/assisting subproblem. To observe the achieve performance bound, we firstly exploit the exhaustive search based algorithm and block coordinate descent (BCD) based algorithm to solve these two subproblems, respectively. In addition, in order to decrease the time complexities, we further propose one jamming power efficiency sorting based heuristic algorithm and one signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) approximation based fast algorithm. Numerical results present the considerable gains brought from our proposed adaptive proactive eavesdropping strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND
Modern society has witnessed the rapid development of wireless communication technology, based on which numerous important events in various fields such as medical science, education, transportation and so on can be carried efficiently and quickly. However, due to the open and broadcast property of wireless medium and the dispersive characteristics of future communication system, ensuring secure transmission of wireless information would be a challenging task and should be put on the agenda. Responding to this, physical layer security, as a desirable strategy to strength secure communication, has attracted wide attention [1] - [3] , and several ingenious methods such as channel-based secret key [4] ,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Christian Esposito . artificial noise [5] , [6] , cooperative jamming [7] - [9] and so on have been proposed to improve the secrecy performance of legitimate communication as far as possible.
On the other hand, the advanced communication technology is constantly promoting development process, which can also be utilized by some unkind people such as criminals and terrorists, to quietly proceed illegal events such as drug trade, terrorist attack and so on that would pose significant threats on national security. Then from the perspective of legitimate parties, instead of minimizing the successful probability of eavesdropping in the physical layer security framework, it is imminent to develop powerful monitoring schemes for the purpose of detecting the suspicious information as efficiently as possible. In other works, the core work would turn into maximizing the eavesdropping rates over the suspicious channel in order to adopt timely actions. VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ FIGURE 1. An illustration of proceeding wireless energy transfer in phase 1 and adaptively implementing jamming, passive eavesdropping or assisting strategy in phase 2 based on different channel condition.
B. RELATED WORKS
In term of detailed legitimate eavesdropping schemes, various works have provided their solutions [10] - [24] . One wellknown scheme is proactive eavesdropping with jamming, the background and core idea of which are explained as:
The legitimate monitor may be far away from the suspicious transmitter and the quality of the eavesdropping link from the suspicious transmitter to the legitimate monitor may be poor. Then if the legitimate monitor only proceeds conventional passive eavesdropping, the eavesdropping outage event may occur with great probability. Hence, by sending jamming signal continually, the legitimate monitor is able to deliberately reduce the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the suspicious receiver and thus accordingly forces the suspicious transmitter to decrease its transmission rate for maintaining its own outage probability requirement, based on which the successful probability of legitimate eavesdropping would be enhanced. The jamming strategy has been adopted in some representative works [10] - [14] . In particular, [10] firstly studied a classical three-node proactive eavesdropping system where the full-duplex-enabled legitimate monitor eavesdropped the suspicious information using one antenna and transmitted jamming signal using another antenna concurrently, and aimed to optimize the jamming power to maximize the eavesdropping rates. Subsequently, [11] further considered that the monitor may be equipped with multiple antennas and then carried out related performance analysis of eavesdropping non-outage probability under different beamforming schemes. Also, by approximating Bessel function efficiently, [12] proposed a near-optimal jamming power selection scheme in the amplify-and-forward relay system. Recently, [13] considered a jamming-assisted proactive eavesdropping scheme over parallel fading channels, where the monitor injected its jamming power into a subset of channels to force the suspicious transmitter to reselect one best channel, based on this idea [13] derived the optimal number of jamming channels and proposed corresponding optimal jamming power allocation scheme. At the same time, [14] considered a proactive eavesdropping scheme in an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-aided suspicious communication system, where the suspicious UAV intended to broadcast common information to various ground suspicious receivers. By sending jamming signal to the suspicious receivers, the monitor can force the suspicious UAV to accordingly adjust its location in order to maximize the minimal received SNR among the suspicious receivers. According to this principle, [14] determined the optimal jamming power via exhaustive search when the number of suspicious receivers was larger than two and also provided insightful analysis when there existed two suspicious receivers. However, we should observe that proactive eavesdropping with jamming would be no longer desirable in the case where the channel quality between the suspicious transmitter and the monitor is better than that of between the suspicious transmitter and receiver. Hence, expect for passive eavesdropping, an attractive assisting based eavesdropping scheme emerged as the time required [22] - [24] . In particular, in this scheme, the suspicious information can also be forwarded by the legitimate monitor to the suspicious receiver to further enhance its received SNR, so as to deliberately improve the transmission rate of the suspicious transmitter. Thereby, the eavesdropping rates would also increase. Keep this in mind, [22] developed a spoofing relaying technique, such that the full-duplex monitor was able to split the received suspicious signal into two parts for information decoding and signal forwarding, respectively. Specifically, [22] derived the optimal power splitting ratio and designed zero-forcing (ZF) based transmit beamforming at the monitor for adaptively sending constructive/destructive signals to the suspicious receiver. Also, [23] assumed that there may exist multiple suspicious communication links and thus provided valid monitoring power allocation algorithm for maximizing the sum eavesdropping rates. Meanwhile, [24] considered the proactive eavesdropping in a single-relay-assisted suspicious communication system and skillfully exploited different combinations of all strategies in source and relay transmission phases mainly according to the location of the monitor.
C. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
Note that all of aforementioned work assumed that the suspicious transmitter(s) is(are) energy rich. However, one can predict that, with the rapid rise of the Internet of Things (IoTs) industry [25] , the suspicious communication may growingly occur from various kinds of small energy-constrained sensors to the micro access point. For instance, some spies intend to steal the secrets of a military base and may spray hundreds of tiny sensors with small batteries around it for collecting confidential information. Then, in order to identify what contents or objects the suspicious sensors may be interested and then take corresponding counterattack, the monitor can first act as the masked power beacon to transmit wireless energy signal to the suspicious transmitter deliberately in phase 1 of each transmission time block, then proceeds proactive eavesdropping via adaptive jamming, passive eavesdropping or assisting strategy in phase 2. Motivated by this potential suspicious communication scenario, this paper mainly aims to provide the specific optimization designs including strategies selection and power allocation at the monitor (which has limited transmit power) in order to maximize the sum eavesdropping rates over several time blocks. The main contributions are listed as follows:
• Assuming that the monitor has finite power [10] - [24] , for one transmission time block we fundamentally determine the optimal eavesdropping strategy including jamming, passive eavesdropping and assisting in phase 2 and the optimal power allocation between phases 1 and 2 based on real-time channel condition. Specifically, after complex derivations, we prove that only comparing the values of the channel power gains from the suspicious transmitter to the suspicious receiver and the monitor is not sufficient for optimal strategy selection in phase 2. To determine the final strategy, the values of the double channel power gain from the suspicious transmitter to the suspicious receiver and the channel power gain from the suspicious transmitter to the monitor need to be further compared. In addition, we provide the following conclusions: when jamming is implemented in phase 2, jamming power should be set such that the channel capacities of the eavesdropping and suspicious links are same, and the remain power should be used for energy transfer in phase 1; when passive eavesdropping is implemented in phase 2, the monitor should exhaust its power for energy transfer in phase 1 and when assisting is implemented, the optimal power allocation between phases 1 and 2 can be obtained via one-dimensional search.
• Subsequently, under the off-line framework, we formulate the problem of maximizing the sum eavesdropping rates over N (N ≥ 1) time blocks subjected to the constraints of limited power at the monitor, which is explained as a difficult mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINIP) problem. However, after careful analysis, we find that this problem can be divided into a jamming subproblem and a passive eavesdropping/assisting subproblem, which are independent of each other. Then, in order to evaluate the achievable performance bound, we provide one exhaustive search based algorithm for solving the former subproblem and also prove that the block coordinate descent (BCD) based algorithm can be exploited for solving the latter subproblem, respectively.
• To efficiently solve these two subproblems with low time complexities, we further propose one jamming power efficiency sorting based heuristic algorithm and one SNR approximation based fast algorithm, the pretty good performance of which is verified in the simulations. In addition, results show the considerable gains produced by the proposed adaptive proactive eavesdropping strategies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present the system model. In section III, we provide three important propositions for subsequent optimization analysis. In section IV, the optimization problem is formulated and the detailed solving schemes are depicted. Section V presents the numerical results of the proposed schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a three-node proactive eavesdropping system, where the two-antenna full-duplex-enabled legitimate monitor E aims to eavesdrop the data communication from the single-antenna energy-constrained suspicious source S to the single-antenna suspicious destination D.
Specifically, we consider the information eavesdropping over N (N ≥ 1) time blocks. By adopting the well-known time switching protocol, each time block i (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }) of period T is divided into two phases: As illustrated in Fig. 1 , in phase 1 of period τ i T (0 < τ i < 1), E acts as the masked power beacon deliberately and aims to activate the suspicious data transmission by transmitting energy-bear signal to S; In phase 2 of period (1−τ i )T , S uploads its data to D by exhausting the harvested energy in phase 1. Same with [22] - [24] , we assume that S adopts adaptive rate transmission scheme according to the effective channel condition at D. In phase 2, E intends to achieve efficient eavesdropping by adaptively implementing jamming, passive eavesdropping or assisting strategy based on different channel condition, for which the details are presented in next section. Without loss of generality and for simplicity, we set τ i = 1/2, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N } and T = 1. Note that the action of choosing different τ i ∈ (0, 1) has no impact on the conclusions obtained. However, each τ i can also be optimized to further improve performance, which will be discussed in our future work.
For
respectively. Note that CN (0, γ k ) refers to the distribution of a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance γ k . In addition, let g k,i = h k,i 2 denote the corresponding channel power gain. We assume that all channel coefficients keep constant during each time block and vary independently between different time blocks. In addition, it is assumed that E can acquire all channel state information (CSI) in order to reveal the fundamental limit of legitimate eavesdropping, while S and D are not aware of true identity of E and just know the CSI of the suspicious link [22] - [24] .
III. IMPORTANT PROPOSITIONS
In this section, as the preliminary work for subsequent optimization analysis, we aim to discuss and solve two problems: i) For time block i, if E decides to proceed eavesdropping with given finite power Q i , in order to maximize the eavesdropping rates, which strategy is optimal at E in phase 2? ii) Which power allocation scheme (P 1,i , P 2,i ) (P 1,i + P 2,i = Q i ) for phases 1 and 2 is optimal? For which we provide following three propositions.
Proposition 1: When g 1,i > g 2,i , the best strategy of E in phase 2 is jamming and the optimal power allocation for phases 1 and 2 is (
, where N 0 denotes the noise power suffered by the monitor and the suspicious destination.
Proof: In jamming strategy with power allocation (P 1,i , P 2,i ), the harvested energy and transmit power of S in phase 1 and phase 2 are, respectively, given as E S,i = ηP 1,i g 0,i /2, and P S,i = E S,i /(1/2) = ηP 1,i g 0,i , where η is the energy conversion efficiency. The received signals at D and E in phase 2 when E exploits the full-duplex technique can be, respectively, expressed as
where x S,i and x E,i denote the information and jamming symbol with unit power, and n D,i ∼ CN (0, N 0 ) and n (A) E,i ∼ CN (0, N 0 ) are the respective additive white Gaussian noises (AWGNs) at D and E. For E, we assume that the selfinterference between the eavesdropping antenna and jamming antenna can be cancelled perfectly based on advanced analog and digital cancellation techniques [10] , [16] , [23] . Assuming that the signals transmitted by S and E are both Gaussian distributed, the received SNRs at D and E are respectively given as
Without loss of generality, we set η = 1 in this paper. Also, the action of choosing different η ∈ (0, 1] has no impact on the conclusions obtained. Note that only when γ E,i ≥ γ D,i , E can perfectly eavesdrop the suspicious data with efficient eavesdropping SNR γ D,i and rates R E = 1 2 log 2 (1 + γ D,i ) with arbitrary small error probability [22] , where the term '' 1 2 '' represents the efficient information transmission time under the time switching protocol. Moreover, if γ E,i < γ D,i , E cannot decode the suspicious information without any error and the effective eavesdropping rates would be zero. Hence, the optimal P 2,i should be set such that γ E,i = γ D,i , i.e.,
In addition, with P * 2,i at hand, we can know that γ D,i (γ E,i ) is an increasing function with respect to (w.r.t) P 1,i , which indicates that the remaining power should be exploited for phase 1. Hence, we have
This completes the proof. Thus we can conclude that when g 1,i > g 2,i and given finite power Q i at E, the maximal eavesdropping rates is expressed as
Proposition 2: When g 1,i ≤ g 2,i ≤ 2g 1,i , the best strategy of E in phase 2 is passive eavesdropping and the optimal power allocation for phases 1 and 2 is (P * 1,i , P * 2,i ) = (Q i , 0). Proof: We prove Proposition 2 by contradiction. First, it is obvious that the jamming strategy is unacceptable in this case. Then, instead of considering passive eavesdropping strategy, we now assume that E adopts the assisting strategy and 0 < P 2,i < Q i . Hence, in order to further improve the received SNR at D, E would split the received signal in phase 2 into two parts, one for information relaying and the other for information decoding. Denote λ i as the power splitting ratio at E, the signal split for information relaying is given as
Then the signalỹ E,i amplified and forwarded by E is expressed as
where n (R) E,i is assumed to dominate over the antenna noise n (A) E,i . Hence, same with [22] , we in this paper ignore n (A) E,i in (9) . Thus, we havẽ
where
Note that under the considered scenario, AF technique may be more suitable than decodeand-forward (DF) technique, since the latter generally consumes more processing delay from additional computation. Therefore, it is clear that the received signals at D and E are, respectively, expressed as
Hence, the received SNRs at D and E are given as
Observing (13) and (14), it is concluded that: i) γ D,i and γ E,i are respectively, an increasing function and a decreasing function w.
Then, it is claimed that, given P 1,i and P 2,i , in order to maximize eavesdropping rates, the unique optimal λ * i ∈ (0, 1) must exist and should be set such that γ E,i = γ D,i , which returns that
Substituting (15) into (13) or (14), we get the efficient eavesdropping SNR as
Now we denote that f 1 (P 2,i ) = 4g 2,i g 3,i D i P 2 2,i +E i P 2,i +F i and f 2 (P 2,i ) = 2D i P 2,i + E i . After some algebraic manipulations, we can derive that
From (18), it is concluded that when g 1,i ≤ g 2,i ≤ 2g 1,i , ∂γ D,i ∂P 2,i ≤ 0, which implies that the optimal assisting power in phase 2 is zero. Using the same method, we can conclude that when g 1,i ≤ g 2,i ≤ 2g 1,i , ∂γ D,i ∂P 1,i > 0, for which the proof can be easily obtained and is omitted here. Hence, it is obvious that the optimal power allocations for phases 1 and 2 must be (P * 1,i , P * 2,i ) = (Q i , 0), which is contradictory with the assumption that P 2,i > 0. Then the proof is completed.
Thus we can conclude that when g 1,i ≤ g 2,i ≤ 2g 1,i and given finite power Q i at E, the maximal eavesdropping rates is expressed as
Proposition 3: When g 2,i > 2g 1,i , the best strategy of E in phase 2 is assisting and the optimal power allocation for phases 1 and 2 can be obtained via exhaustive search.
Proof: In this case, we can see from (18) that ∂γ D,i ∂P 2,i > 0. In addition, we also have ∂γ D,i ∂P 1,i > 0. Since the bigger P 1,i and P 2,i in this case all contribute the larger eavesdropping SNR, the power allocation for phases 1 and 2 should be carefully designed with exhaustive search to achieve the optimal tradeoff in order to maximize (16) .
Thus we can conclude that when g 2,i > 2g 1,i and given finite power Q i at E, the maximal eavesdropping rates after optimizing P 1,i and P 2,i is expressed as
Remark 1: When g 2,i ≥ g 1,i , we may intuitively think that the assisting strategy in phase 2 would be always helpful, which is also claimed in [23] . However, we should note that in the assisting strategy, the AF operation at E would also introduce additional noise at D as shown in equation (13), the impact of which may even force the received SNR at D instead decrease. Hence, after strict derivation, we prove that it is necessary to further compare the values of g 2,i and 2g 1,i for determining the final strategy, which is not documented in [23] and is one of the important contributions in this paper. Moreover, this conclusion is very important for subsequent optimization analysis.
IV. SUM EAVESDROPPING RATES MAXIMIZATION
Now, let us formally consider our optimization problem, which aims to maximize the sum eavesdropping rates over N time blocks subject to finite transmit power Q E at E. The proposed scheme is feasible if E has perfect knowledge of all instantaneous CSI, the reasons has been explained in [26] . 1 To proceed, we first classify N time blocks into three subsets, i.e., 1 = i|g 1,i > g 2,i , 2 = i|g 1,i ≤ g 2,i ≤ 2g 1,i and 3 = i|g 2,i > 2g 1,i . Then, according to (7) , (19) and (20) , we can observe that, for passive eavesdropping and assisting strategies, E can always obtain non-zero eavesdropping rates as long as the transmit power in phase 1 is larger than zero. However, for the efficient jamming strategy, E can acquire non-zero eavesdropping rates if and only if it has non-zero transmit power in phase 1 and enough power for jamming in phase 2. Hence, in order to maximize the sum eavesdropping rates, two important issues should be considered: i) How to select finite time blocks that belongs to 1 for eavesdropping when Q E is finite; ii) How to allocate transmit power of E among N time blocks. Then, the optimization problem should be formulated as P0 : max {1i,Qi,Wi,P1,i,P2,i} 1 In fact, it is well known that the optimization strategies (in our work, they refer to eavesdropping strategy selection and power allocation scheme) under finite time length can be generally implemented under two different frameworks, i.e., online and off-line. Under online framework, the optimization strategies are only based on current and past information of channel gains. The online framework is more practical but at the same time much challenging to design. Under off-line framework, channel gains of N time slots are assumed to be known beforehand. This allows the eavesdropping strategy selection and power allocation scheme problem to be formulated as a deterministic power optimization problem within a time period. We should note that although off-line framework is less practical, it provides an upperbound on the performance for practical designs. Hence, we can see that there are still various valuable papers considering the off-line framework, such as [27] - [29] . In our future work, we promise that we will try our best to investigate the detailed optimization strategies under the online framework.
and note that 1 i = 1 and 1 i = 0 indicate that E decides and abandons eavesdropping in time block i ∈ 1 , respectively. In addition, note that W i is the transmit power of E in phase 1 of time block i ∈ 2 , and P 1,i and P 2,i are included in B i and C i . Obviously, P0 involves integer and continuous variables and is a difficult mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem, which is hard to be optimized in general. However, based on the special structure of this optimization problem, we can divide P0 into two independent subproblems P1 and P2 through a power partition coefficient θ (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). In detail, we aim to divide the total transmit power Q E into two parts: θ Q E would be exploited for information eavesdropping over the subset 1 and (1 − θ )Q E would be exploited for information eavesdropping over the subsets 2 and 3 . Then, P1 and P2 are recast as
P2 : max {Wi,P1,i,P2,i}
21(e). (23c)
Now, we should solve P1 and P2 and compute the corresponding outcome with given θ . Then P0 will be solved by first comparing the sum of the outcomes of P1 and P2 under different θ and then finding the maximum.
A. OPTIMAL ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING P1
To solve P1 optimally, we should first find all feasible time block sets for eavesdropping via exhaustive searching with time complexity O(2 | 1 | ), where |·| denotes the cardinality of a set. Note that for each feasible time block set E ∈ 1 , it must satisfy that θ Q E > i∈ E (g 1,i −g 2,i )N 0 g 2,i g 3,i , such that the jamming strategy can be implemented in each time block i ∈ E . Then, based on the analysis in Proposition 1, we can know that, for each E , the optimization problem should be formulated as
Consequently, to maximize the objective function of P3, the transmit power for energy transfer over different time blocks belonging to E should be allocated as
where ν is a threshold to be determined from the total transmit power constraint (24b). Note that the transmit power adaptive method is water-filling [30] over the time blocks with time complexity O(| 1 |). Then by solving P3 for each E and comparing all outcomes, the optimal solution of P1 can be obtained with total time complexity O(2 | 1 | | 1 |).
Algorithm 1 Proposed Heuristic Algorithm for Solving P1
1: Input: 4 Select the subset 4 (j) 4 (j) consists of the first j elements of 4 ;
6:
If i∈ 4 (j)
>θ Q E : Break;
7:
Else: Find the optimal power allocation for these j blocks and compute the outcome (denote as T j ); 8: = ∪ T j ; 9: end. 10: Output: max , corresponding 4 (j) and power allocation scheme.
B. HEURISTIC ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING P1
Considering the great searching complexity (especially when N is large) shown in subsection A, we now provide a heuristic algorithm by taking the consideration of jamming power efficiency, as shown in Algorithm 1. In particular, we firstly determine each feasible time block for eavesdropping via step 1. Then we provide the priority of different feasible time block via steps 2 and 3 using the indicator χ i , which reflects the eavesdropping rates per unit power. Subsequently, we start the priority-based search and computation process, as shown in steps 4-9, where step 7 is implemented with water-filling power allocation algorithm with complexity O(| 1 |). Finally, the algorithm compares all outcomes produced in steps 4-9 and outputs the scheme which maximizes the eavesdropping rates. Note that the complexity of step 4 is O(| 1 |). Hence, the total time complexity is O(| 1 | 2 ).
C. BLOCK COORDINATE DESCENT (BCD) ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING P2
As we can see, R 2 + R 3 is not a joint concave function w.r.t all W i , P 1,i and P 2,i , which is due to fact that for each i ∈ 3 , P 1,i and P 2,i are coupled with each other in the expression of B i . In order to solve P2 efficiently, we now provide two propositions as the preliminary work for implementing the BCD algorithm [31] , [32] , the key idea of which is to solve the non-convex problem P2 by fixing either W i , P 1,i or P 2,i at one time, and then alternates until convergence.
Proposition 4: When fixing all P 2,i , R 2 +R 3 is joint concave w.r.t all W i and P 1,i .
Proof: Firstly, it is observed that arbitrary W i , i ∈ 2 and P 1,i , i ∈ 3 are independent of each other. Also, it is clear that when fixing all P 1,i and P 2,i , R 2 +R 3 is joint concave w.r.t all W i . Then, we need prove that when fixing all W i and P 2,i , R 2 + R 3 is joint concave w.r.t all P 1,i .
From (16) , we can compute the second-order derivative of γ D,i (γ E,i ) w.r.t P 1,i as shown in (26) , as shown at the top of the next page, based on which it is clear that when g 2,i > 2g 1,i , (16) is concave w.r.t P 1,i , ∀i ∈ 3 . Since log-convexity is a stronger condition than function convexity and arbitrary P 1,i is independent of each other, the proof can be completed.
Proposition 5: When fixing all W i and P 1,i , R 2 + R 3 is joint concave w.r.t all P 2,i .
Proof: Also, note that arbitrary P 2,i is independent of each other. Then, based on the expression of ∂γ D,i ∂P 2,i shown in (17) , we can further compute the second-order derivative of γ D,i (γ E,i ) w.r.t P 2,i as shown in (27) , as shown at the top of the next page, from which we can see that when g 2,i > 2g 1,i ,
Then the proof is completed.
In addition, note that the constraints in (23b) and (23c) are affine. Then, we can exploit the BCD algorithm to solve P2 efficiently, for which the details are presented in Algorithm 2. In particular, we set = 0 : δ : 1 in order to find the optimal power allocation scheme for the initialization values 
steps 4-9 to iteratively obtain the stable solution, where steps 6 and 7 can be implemented using the interior point method with complexity O((| 2 | + | 3 |) 3.5 ) [33] . Note that the complexities of step 2 and steps 4-9 are δ −1 and O(µ(| 2 | + | 3 |) 3.5 log(ε −1 )), where µ is the average number of iteration times. Hence, the total time complexity is O(δ −1 µ(| 2 | + | 3 |) 3.5 log(ε −1 )).
Convergence Analysis: As aforementioned, one iteration carries out between Steps 6 and 7 of the proposed algorithm. Apparently the convergence of Algorithm 2 depends on the convergence of this iteration. During the k-th iterations, according to Proposition 4, it is not difficult that W
1,i can be firstly calculated optimally via interior point method based on the power allocation P (k−1) 2,i from previous iteration. Denoting by R = R 2 + R 3 , we can get:
It reveals that the sequence of iteration produces monotonically increasing results. As W
1,i is obtained, we now should move forward to update P (k) 2,i optimally via Proposition 5. Hence we have:
Therefore, by combining the above two inequalities we have:
which implies that the achievable sum eavesdropping rates are nondecreasing during per-each iteration. In addition, it is clear that the value of the objective function, i.e., R 2 + R 3 , is upper bounded by the fixed ω, θ and Q E constraints. As a result, the proposed iterative algorithm is therefore convergent.
D. FAST ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING P2
In this subsection, we aim to solve P2 with a fast algorithm, which reduces the time complexity greatly and can also yield the pretty good performance at the same time.
In fact, it is the involved structure of each term in the expression of R 3 that makes the optimization for P2 more complex. To simplify this structure, we first approximate the expression of each γ D,i , i ∈ 3 shown in (13) . Note that
where the approximation in (31) is reported to be efficient over entire SNR regime [34] and the approximation in (32) is tight in the high SNR regime. Then, γ D,i is approximated as γ appr D,i = min λ i P 1,i g 0,i g 2,i N 0 , P 2,i g 3,i N 0 + P 1,i g 0,i g 1,i
Similarly, with γ appr D,i at hand, it is obvious that, given P 1,i and P 2,i (P 1,i + P 2,i = Q i ), by adjusting the value of λ i , the maximal eavesdropping rates for each time block i ∈ 3 must be achieved when γ appr D,i = γ E,i . Then, for arbitrary i ∈ 3 , given Q i , the eavesdropping SNR maximization problem (which is equivalent to the eavesdropping rates maximization problem) should be formulated as P4 : max
Honestly speaking, P4 is still non-convex and hard to be solved. However, based on the good structure of (34b), we can heuristically introduce a new variable, i.e., X = λ i P 1,i g 0,i g 2,i N 0 / P 2,i g 3,i N 0 (35) based on which the solution of P4 would be given with one shot. The details are presented as follows. Specifically, since P 1,i (P 2,i ) can be adjusted in the interval (0, Q i ) and λ i ∈ (0, 1), it is obvious that X can be an arbitrary value in the range (0, ∞). Then two cases in term of different values of X should be discussed: 1) 0 < X ≤ 1: In this case, min(
and λ i = P 2,i g 3,i X P 1,i g 0,i g 2,i . Substituting λ i and X into (34b) and exploiting (34c), we can compute that
then we have
Substituting (36) and (38) into (34a), P4 will be simplified as
where G i = g 0,i g 1,i g 3,i + g 0,i g 2,i g 3,i , H i = g 0,i g 2,i g 3,i ,
To solve P4.1, we can denote f 1,i 
. After some algebraic manipulations, the first derivative of f 1,i (X) is computed as
. Then, it is verified that ∂f 1,i (X) ∂X X∈(0,1] > 0. Hence, the optimal value of X in this case should be set to 1, which implies that we just need consider the 1 ≤ X < ∞ case, as shown in the follows.
2) 1 ≤ X < ∞: In this case, min(
and λ i = P 2,i g 3,i X P 1,i g 0,i g 2,i . After some algebraic manipulations, we can also compute that
1+1/X )g 3,i X g 0,i g 2,i g 3,i (X + 1) =
Substituting (40) and (42) into (34a), P4 will be simplified as
Similarly, we denote f 2,i (X) = L i X 2
. Now, by determining the monotonicity of f 2,i (X), the maximal value (denote as f * 2,i (X)) of f 2,i (X) in the range [1, ∞) can be easily found with simple analysis, for which the details are omitted. Note that although this monotonicity is not obvious in the interval [1, ∞), we can directly determine it by solving the simple equation
Then, P4 would be solved by just determining f * 2,i (X) and corresponding λ i , P 1,i and P 2,i .
Insight: Let T = X X+1 . Then we have T ∈ [1/2 , 1) when X ∈ [1, ∞) . Interestingly enough, it is clear that λ i in (38) is an increasing function w.r.t T when T ∈ [1/2 , 1). Then we have
From (40) it is concluded that when g 2,i > 2g 1,i , the optimal power splitting ratio λ * i at E would be greater than 3 8 . Remark 2: It must be emphasized that, when 0 < X ≤ 1, it is proved that P 1,i in (36) would increase w.r.t X and its value belongs to (0, 2g 3,i 2g 3,i +g 0,i g 2,i −g 0,i g 1,i /2 Q i ] and when 1 ≤ X < ∞, P 1,i in (40) would increase w.r.t X and its value belongs to [ 2g 3,i 2g 3,i +g 0,i g 2,i −g 0,i g 1,i /2 Q i , Q i ). Hence, we can know that through setting the variable X belonging to (0, ∞), P 1,i (so does P 2,i ) can reach arbitrary value in the interval (0, Q i ) and different value of X corresponds to different pair of (P 1,i , P 2,i ). Then, it is concluded that the solution of P4.2 must be the solution of P4. Now, it is clear that the efficient eavesdropping SNR for time block i ∈ 3 can be directly written as the form that is proportional to the given transmit power Q i with the help of the coefficient f * 2,i (X), which avoids the complex exhaustive search for finding the optimal power allocation (P * 1,i , P * 2,i ) explained in Proposition 3. Then the optimization problem of maximizing the approximated sum eavesdropping rates for the sets 2 and 3 with total transmit power (1 − θ )Q E can be directly formulated as
Similarly, to maximize the objective function of P5, the transmit power should be allocated as
Optimal transmit power P * 1,i under three cases for maximizing the eavesdropping rates in time block i with given power Q i = 1.5 mW (P 2,i = Q i − P 1,i ). For more intuitive display, we set g 0,i = 1.5, g 1,i = 8, g 2,i = 0.8, g 3,i = 0.01 in case 1; g 0,i = 0.01, g 1,i = 0.04, g 2,i = 0.07, g 3,i = 0.01 in case 2; and g 0,i = 0.01, g 1,i = 0.04, g 2,i = 0.2, g 3,i = 0.01 in case 3, respectively. In addition, we set N 0 = 10 −4 mW.
where χ is a threshold to be determined from the total transmit power constraint (45b). Obviously, considering the complexity of computing each f * 2,i (X), the total time complexity of the proposed fast algorithm would only be O(| 2 | + 2 | 3 |).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, simulations are done to validate the performance of proposed optimal and suboptimal strategies. Note that the optimal (suboptimal) strategy means that P1 and P2 are solved via optimal (heuristic) algorithm and BCD (fast) algorithm, respectively. In order to provide fair performance comparison between different strategies, the average channel power gains are assumed to be same and are set as: √ γ k = d −ϑ (d = 10 m and ϑ = 2), ∀k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, where d denotes the distance between E and S, E and D and S and D, and ϑ denotes the path loss factor. In addition, we set the noise power N 0 = −40 dBm.
To proceed, we first exploit Fig. 2 to verify the correctness of the first three propositions. From which we can see that: in case 1, the eavesdropping rates would increase as P 1,i increases from zero to Q i − (g 1,i −g 2,i )N 0 g 2,i g 3,i , since at this time the received SNR at D would be smaller than the received SNR at E and the eavesdropping rates is expressed as R E = 1 2 log 2 (1 + P 1,i g 0,i g 1,i P 2,i g 3,i +N 0 ). However, once P 1,i is greater than
, the eavesdropping rates would become zero, since at that time P 2,i would be smaller than (g 1,i −g 2,i )N 0 g 2,i g 3,i and the received SNR at E would be smaller than the received SNR at D. Hence we have P * 1,i = Q i − (g 1,i −g 2,i )N 0 g 2,i g 3,i . In case 2, we assume that the assisting strategy is adopted and further plot the performance curve of each power allocation (P 1,i , P 2,i ). Then it is obvious that the optimal power allocation is (P * 1,i , P * 2,i ) = (Q i , 0), which implies that the assisting strategy is not efficient in this case. Note that in case 3, since P 1,i and P 2,i all contribute the larger efficient eavesdropping SNR, we need employ exhaustive search to obtain the optimal P * 1,i , the value of which may be smaller than Q i , as shown in Fig. 2 . Then it is confirmed that the assisting strategy is necessary in case 3 since P * 2,i > 0. In addition, we can see that the performance of the fast algorithm in term of maximizing eavesdropping rates almost approaches that of exhaustive search, which confirms the effectiveness of the proposed fast algorithm.
Then, in order to show the advantages of our proposed strategies, we also consider the following strategies as comparison:
• Jamming Strategy: Given total transmit power Q E , the monitor only performs optimal power allocation over the subset 1 ;
• Passive Eavesdropping Strategy: Given total transmit power Q E , the monitor only performs optimal power allocation over the subset 2 ; • Assisting Strategy: Given total transmit power Q E , the monitor only performs optimal power allocation over the subset 3 . In addition, we provide the time complexities of different strategies as shown in TABLE I. The advantage of the suboptimal strategy is obvious, since it would achieve pretty good performance (as shown in subsequent analysis) and its complexity would not increase exponentially as N increases.
From Fig. 3 , we can see that the sum eavesdropping rates of five eavesdropping strategies all increase with the increasing finite transmit power Q E , since the larger Q E would provide more feasible sub-blocks which are jammingenabled and more power for efficient passive eavesdropping and assisting. In addition, the effectiveness of the suboptimal strategy is verified, as its performance can clearly approach that of optimal strategy. Moreover, the jamming, passive eavesdropping or assisting strategy, which can be obviously regarded as the special case of our proposed strategy and therefore owns poor performance. More importantly, in our considered energy-constrained scenario, it is observed that the transmit power of S in fact is determined by E, which implies that when Q E becomes large, the transmit power of S also increases and sum eavesdropping rates would not tend to be saturated. Note that this phenomenon does not occur in [22] - [24] , as [22] - [24] assumed that the transmit power of S is constant. Fig. 4 shows that the sum eavesdropping rates of different strategies all increase as N increases. In our considered scenario, larger N implies that E can perform more flexible strategies selection and power allocation for achieving more efficient eavesdropping. This phenomenon can also be similarly observed in the OFDM systems [35] where more orthogonal channels can provide higher channel capacity.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper have explored and studied the detailed eavesdropping strategies for the potential energy-constrained suspicious communication system. Specifically, in order to solve the problem of eavesdropping rates maximization in one time block under the constraint of limited transmit power at the monitor, we have determined the optimal eavesdropping strategy and corresponding power allocation scheme according to our provided strict proofs. Based on which we intend to further solve the optimization problem of maximizing sum eavesdropping rates in finite time blocks under the off-line framework, which is explained as a difficult mixed-inter nonlinear programming problem. Fortunately, due to the special property of this problem, we have divided it into two independent subproblems and then provided corresponding four algorithms. Simulation results have shown the considerable gain brought from our schemes.
